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ABSTRACT
Advanced Persistent Threats(APT) are a serious concern to secure an organization. The sophistica-
tion of APT attacks is much discussed, and the recent compromising of Google, RSA and Sony using
APTs has gained lots of attentions. Successful protection against APTs should complement traditional
perimeter and infrastructure security measures and policies. In this paper, we show that adding APTs
in our threat landscape, conventional attack graphs for realistic environments are quite dense meaning
that their utility is quite limited. This density is a consequence of common, inherent vulnerabilities
in conventional computing systems and network environments. Our approach is to formally define a
set of vulnerabilities that we call privilege expansion vulnerabilities. A superset of privilege escalation
vulnerabilities, privilege expansion refers to cases where an attacker can either earn greater privilege
on the current host or use his current privilege to earn privileges on other hosts. Based on our formal
definitions, we define a set of rules for adding edges to attack graphs and develop a tool that computes
a closure of these rules in the graph. For two example environments, we compute new attack graphs
incorporating these new edges and demonstrate the use of the tool by evaluating addressing 4 different
privilege expansion vulnerabilities.
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Attack graphs (AGs) have been proposed for a multitude of practical network and organizational
security uses. In our study of the attack graph literature, we have discovered that many so-called priv-
ilege expansion vulnerabilities (PEVs) have been left out of the analyses. Unfortunately, this oversight
causes some of the analyses in the past work to be dramatically optimistic in terms of the security of
the network or organization. Two competing conclusions can be drawn from this work:
• Current attack graph methodologies must be extended to deal with the added complexity of PEVs.
• If one accepts the existing attack graph methodologies, then we must make greater effort to make
attacks on PEVs more difficult..
In this work, we develop a structured representation of common vulnerabilities and develop a tool that
applies these to an organization’s conventional attack graph. We find that the density of the graph
grows dramatically in density and exploitability. Furthermore, we demonstrate the effect of addressing
privilege expansion vulnerabilities by doing ”what if” experiments using our tool.
Attack graphs have had several incarnations in the literature, but in general they can be described
as a graph of access states reachable by an attacker. The states are connected by directed edges that
indicate an attack is possible from the current state to another one. To our knowledge, all published
AG work to date has been based on rather simplistic types of attacks such as remote root/user attacks,
.rhosts, local user to root attacks, and the like while constrained by issues such as reachability between
hosts enforced by tools such as firewalls. The result is that it is possible to generate attack graphs by
processing the output of network vulnerability scanners and related tools.
In our opinion, this focus on attacks in the AG literature has lead it to neglect of widespread, practi-
cal vulnerabilities that are common knowledge of attackers and penetration testers.1 For example, with
1Although users of attack graphs may be taking these vulnerabilities into account, it is not apparent to the authors that the
past work has given such guidance. Furthermore, as we show in this paper, taking PEVs into account dramatically increases
2access to the appropriate privilege, it is relatively easy to monitor networks for passwords, install key-
logging software or other malware thereby capturing passwords for users of the network. This equates
to several classes of vulnerabilities inherent to common operating systems and their typical configura-
tions. In this case and others that we describe more formally in Section 3, these PEVs create a many
new edges and reachable states in the attack graph thereby increasing the density of the attack graph for
an organization. Furthermore, as we consider different classes of PEVs, we show that closures of the
graph over different classes of PEVs exacerbate the density issue.
As in past AG work (described in Section 2), our approach begins with two simple example network
scenarios. We extract the attack graph for the network based on a manual analysis. For 5 PEVs, we have
developed a set of formal rules for extending the original attack graph. We then apply these rules in turn
such that no further edges can be added to the resulting AG thereby greatly increasing its density. Based
on this analysis, in Section 4 we consider how this density affects proposed applications of AGs and
what it implies for network security . In Section 5, we describe a tool we have developed to evaluate the
effects of PEVs on an organizational attack graph. As future work, we conclude with a discussion of
approaches to evaluating the prevalence of these issues in large-scale network AGs and with approaches
to dealing with the increased complexity that PEVs add to attack graphs.
the size of AGs and hence affects scaleability.
3CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUD AND PAST WORK ON ATTCK GRAPH
2.1 The Attack Graph Formalism and Terminology
Many variations on the attack graph formalism exist in the past work, but in general they essentially
all share the following characteristics.
Definition 1. An attack graph is 3-tuple, AG = (S,E, L) where
• S is a set of states of the form, (h, p), wher h is an host object, and p is some privilege on that
host.
• E is a set of directed edges, (si, sj) : si, sj ∈ S such that there exists a vulnerability in the
network such that a subject attains sj .p privileges on host sj .h. given the privileges si.p on host
Si.h.
• L is a function mapping e ∈ E onto a subset of the possible vulnerabilities, Ve ⊂ V .
Note that this formalism,AG, can be viewed as a requires/provides graph [17], a finite state machine
(by adding an initial state as well as one or more goal states) as in [6], and a markov system by adding
probabilities to each edge and an initial vector[15]. These and other works on the topic attempt to
encode a dependency graph that allows for some sort of automated or manual analysis.
It should also be noted that the term ”attack graph” is something of a misnomer. Each edge typ-
ically represts a possible attack on the target of the edge from its source node. In other words, the
edges are vulnerabilities and not strictly attacks. This would be a simple case of mistaken terminology,
but we argue that it has lead to an underestimation of the density of attack graphs and a subsequent
overestimation of their utility in typical environments. We discuss this in greater detail in the following
sections.
42.2 Usage of Attack Graphs
Attack Graphs have been proposed for manys uses including risk assessment, network hardening
and intrusion detection.
Risk Assessment Risk assessment becomes more challenging as the size of network is increasing
and attacks are growing more sophisticated. A realistic risk assessment not only takes into account the
potential impacts of individual vulnerabilities and threats, but also all possible combinations and vul-
nerability interdependence. Attack graphs are models where all isolated vulnerabilities are constructed
as possible attack paths. Several papers [2] [1][15] [7] have proposed quantitative and qualitative ap-
proachs for security evaluation based on attack graphs. In our paper, we apply the metrics defined in [1]
and [15] in section 3.
Network hardening Security analysts can also use attack graphs to determine the most efficent
or the minimum cost set of actions to prevent attacks against some given critical resources [13][5][18].
These actions may include changing configuration or introducing new countermeasures, patching suf-
ficient network vulnerabilites at the entry points, or adding intrusion detection systems to monitor net-
work activities.
Intrusion Detection Attack graph can enhance the alert correlation approaches in a number of
ways, for instance, matching intrusion events, hypothesizing missing events, recognizing attack pat-
terns, predicting attack plan and protecting IDS form alert flooding attacks. In [11][14], the authors
propose correlating alerts using attack graphs. The idea is to group alarms corresponding to edges
nearby in the graph to eliminate false positives and detect higher-level attacks.
Each of these uses depend on the attack graph to be an accurate representation of the network en-
vironment’s vulnerability. Our work shows how the attack graph changes radically when PEVs are
considered. Most of this past work has ignored the majority of the PEVs we discuss leading to strongly
optimistic results in that the number of states reachable by an attacker is underrepresented in the pre-
sented attack graphs. In fairness, we also note that attack graphs are by necessity always somewhat
optimistic as it is unlikely that an analyst has a comprehensive database of all vulnerabilities in a large
5network. Our goal is to show the importance of incorporating PEVs (and other wide-spread vulnerabil-
ities) into graph-based security analyses.
6CHAPTER 3. PRIVILEGE EXPANSION VULNERABILITIES
In this section, we describe a set of well-known vulnerabilities and formalize rules for each that
modify an existing attack graph. Another way to think about these rules is that they specify a set of
default edges in an attack graph for an organization given its hosts, users, network topology, and certain
information about security mechanisms employed by the systems.
For our purposes here, a privilege expansion vulnerability is a property of one or more hosts in the
network such that an attacker can gain some new privilege through some feasible action. Note that such
an action is not necessarily an attack. In terms of an attack graph, a PEV is a reachable state in the
attack graph coupled with properties of one or more related hosts that then allows us to add new edges
to the graph. This returns to our earlier assertion that if we only consider AGs composed of conspicuous
attack behavior then we underestimate the security situation significantly.
3.1 Authentication Relations
Several of our PEVs are related to authentication weaknesses in remote login mechanisms. In par-
ticular, we focus on the the observability and reusability of authentication information. The developed
relation will be useful in defining several of our rules below.
Hosts use a variety of authentication systems to establish subject identity. These range from un-
trustworthy claims of source address to passwords to challenge/response systems based on public key
cryptography. For our purposes, we classify an authentication mechanism based on whether the ob-
servability of authenticator data on the network and whether the data is reuseable by an attacker if it is
monitored either in the network or otherwise.
Definition 2. Let Reuseable be a function Reuseable : u × h → {True, False}, where u is a user
identifier on the host, h. Reuseable will be true if and only if the user u can authenticate to a service on
7h such that the authentication information provided by u can be replayed to authenticate for another
session if acquired by another subject.
Definition 3. Let Observable be a function Observable : u× h→ {True, False}, where u is a user
identifier on the host h. Observable is true when u is able to authenticate to some service of h over the
network using a method such that an evesdropper can observe the value of the authenticator.
For our purposes, these two functions conveniently describe authentication mechanisms while ig-
noring mostly irrelevant detail. If a host, h1 uses passwords and clear text login protocols such as telnet
for a user u1, then Observable(h1, u1) ∧ Reuseable(h1, u1). An SSH service configured to accept
only encrypted connections but authenticating with passwords would result in ¬Observable(h1, u1) ∧
Reuseable(h1, u1)—thereby encoding that although one can not intercept the password in transit, it is
still possible for someone to use the password to authenticate in the future if it is captured on either the
client or server hosts. A one-time password scheme would be observable yet not reuseable.
Note that we do not specify the service for which the user is requesting authentication in the above
functions. This is slightly sloppy as it neglects the case where multiple login services are available
on a host with inconsistent observability or reuseability values. For the purposes of this paper, we
will assume all login services of interest on a given host for a user have the same observability and
reusability. This simplifies the forthcoming rules but does so in a way that the attack graph remains
optimistic in the sense that it still underestimates possible actions of attacker.
Another issue with these functions is that it is possible to have multiple authentication methods for
a single service. Systems such as pluggable authentication modules (PAM) and SSH can create this
situation. Because attack graphs encode the actions possible for an attacker, the solution here is to
consider that if any of the mechanisms use reuseable authenticators, we should assert that it the case
is reuseable, otherwise the authenticator should be considered nonreuseable. If any of the mechanisms
rely on observable authenticators, then we only consider the the host to have observable authenticators
if that same mechanism is also reuseable. In other words, the observable case is only useful if that
same mechanism is reuseable. Example: One-time passwords (transmitted in the clear) configured in
a login service that also supports encrypted tunnels using conventional passwords. The former case is
observable but not reuseable whereas the latter is only reuseable. An attacker can not easily gain from
8the observability of the one-time passwords hence we consider this case ¬Observable ∧Reuseable.
3.2 Definition of Five Common PE Rules
The easiest, and in our experience with IT infrastructure the most common, PEV is that users share
the same authentication information across different hosts. A well-known problem, the user access PE
rule allows an initial break-in to provide access to a real user’s account across a wide variety of hosts.
PE Rule 1. User Access PE
Given (h, u) ∈ S, if µ = {h￿|Reuseable(u, h￿) ∧Reachable(h￿, h)},
Then E = E ∪￿h￿∈µ(h, u)→ (h￿, u)
Note: The reachability function Reachable(h￿, h) determines that the host h can be reached from
host h’ in the network. This is similar to the reachability described in [4][12].
The User Access PE Rule is prevalent because users for convenience or manageability reasons use
the same passwords or other reuseable authentication methods. This rule affects the attack graph by
adding new edges pointing to the states representing the compromised user account on all other hosts
which are reachable and can be accessed using the same password.
Another ubiquitous issue that has been ignored in the AG community is malware. If an attacker can
cause another user to execute software unknowingly, it is likely that the attacker can gain a password
from the user. There are many ways that this may happen in practice, but for our purposes, we consider
that an attacker has access to a host and that this access allows the attacker to insert some malware
so that the user will automatically execute it. Examples of this are keyloggers (for the targetted user
anyway), Trojan Horse login mechanisms, etc. The difficulty of this varies from system to system and
also depends on the security awareness of the targeted user.
PE Rule 2. Trojan Horse PE
Given (h, u) ∈ S, if Reuseable(u￿, h) ∧ CanGetToExecute(u, u￿),
Then E = E ∪ (h, u)→ (h, u￿)
Note: The function CanGetToExecute(u, u￿) means that u can cause user u￿ to execute some ar-
bitrary code. There are several implications of the Trojan Horse Rule. If the attacker has administrative
9privileges on the system, the trojan horses can do any thing the administrator can do. Trojan horse PE
rule specifies the effect of trojan horse attack on the attack graph. If attackers install a trojan horse
program on the compromised host, and successfully cause other users to execute that program, the new
edges will be added pointing from the state representing the user account on the compromised host to
the state representing the users who executed the trojan on the same host.
PE Rule 3. Local Exploit PE
Given (h, u) ∈ S, if (h, u) LocalAdminExploit(u,h)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ (h, admin),
Then E = E ∪ (h, u)→ (h, admin)
Note: The function LocalAdminExploit(u, h) means that host h has a local exploit which allows
the user u to gain administrative privileges on this host.
Once the attackers remotely login to the compromised host, they will attempt to exploit some local
vulnerabilities to increase their privilege to the administrative level. If the attackers successfully exploit
some user-to admin vulnerability on this affected host, they will take the full control over this system.
The edge from the state representing the user account on the compromised host to the state representing
administrator on the same host will be added to the attack graph.
PE Rule 4. Admin-to-Users PE
Given (h, admin) ∈ S, if µ = {u￿|Reuseable(u￿, h)},
Then E = E ∪￿u￿∈µ(h, admin)→ (h, u￿)
When the attacker has complete control on the compromised host, they will have an excellent chance
to steal all the usernames and passwords on this host. They could access the encrypted password file
or obtain the password hashes, and start cracking passwords. Or the attackers just replace the login
program. The replacement program will record and send the usernames and passwords to the attackers
when users log into the system. According to the Admin-to-User PE rule, if administrative privilege is
obtained on the compromised host, the edges pointing from the state representing the administrator on
this host to the states representing each users on the same host will be added to the attack graph.
PE Rule 5. Network Sniffer PE
Given (h, admin) ∈ S, let µ = {(u￿, h￿)|Reuseable(u￿, h￿)∧Observable(u￿, h￿)∧SameLan(h￿, h)},
Then E = E ∪￿(u￿,h￿)∈µ(h, admin)→ (h￿, u￿)
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Note: The function SameLan(h￿, h) determines that the host h and h’ belongs to the same local
area networks.
When the attackers log into the compromised host as an administrator, they can start up a network
sniffer on each interface, monitoring the network traffic crossing the local area network. All the user-
names and passwords transmitted in clear text will be discovered, and passwords are useful unless they
are reusable. Network Sniffer PE rule exposes the effect of this kind PE vulnerability to the attack graph
by adding the new edges between the state representing the administrator account on the compromised
host and states representing the hosts with user accounts which passwords are reusable and transmitted
in the clear-text on the network.
PE Rule 5 Plus. Given (h, admin) ∈ S, let µ = {(u￿, h￿)|Reuseable(u￿, h￿) ∧ Observable(u￿, h￿) ∧
h ∈ Path(h￿, h￿￿)},
Then E = E ∪￿(u￿,h￿)∈µ(h, admin)→ (h￿, u￿)
Note: The function Path(h￿, h￿￿) determines the transmission path between the host h and h￿￿
Attackers not only can sniff the local network user passwords, but also can see all the traffic across
the LAN and thus can capture sensitive information which transmitted in clear text.
These privilege expansion vulnerabilities are neither new nor exhaustive for host configuration. As
our knowledge, most of attack graphs do analysis ignoring these vulnerabilities, and we need a strong
mechanism and analysis to integrity these issue.
These types of vulnerabilities are different from others, because they are some probability of suc-
cessful attack, for instance, rule 1, 3, 4, and 5. and often require some actions by other users. It may
take times, or may leave subsets of edges being useful for an attacker. Traditional attack graph edges
are probability more likely to be more exploitable, but there are still level of difficulty and uncertainty,
because the local environment may preclude successful exploitation.
Future work could attempt to evaluate the exploitability of the vulnerabilities in the real environ-
ments. Another lesson from this work is to motivate the use of protective measures such as crypto-
graphic authentication, hardening host operating systems, and encrypted network protocols.
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CHAPTER 4. Privilege Expansion Density Effect
In this section, we demonstrate the effect of privilege expansion vulnerabilities on the attack graph
through a network example. In the example, we take the attack graph generated by the previous ap-
proaches [4][19] as input, and then iteratively apply the PE rules to it, until no more rules are appli-
cable. We compare the final output graph with the initial one in respect to graph structure, density,
exploitability[1] and mean effort to security failure [15].
`
Attacker
Perimeter 
Firewall
Internal
Firewall
Switch/
Route
LAN1
H1
H2
H6H5H4
Public Web
Server
Internet
SMTP
Gateway
DMZ Network
 Web ServerFTP ServerDNS&DHCP
Server
LAN2
Internal 
Network
H3
H7 H8 H9
Figure 4.0.1: Example network
Figure 4.0.1 is the example network which consists of three segments: internal network, DMZ and
external network, and contains 9 hosts. The network topology and graph size is similar to scenarios
used in other literatures [20][9]. The attacker starts on the external network at host H1. Connectivity
configuration, user and authentication information, and information of existing vulnerabilities in the
network are specified below:
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Connectivity The perimeter firewall only allows attackers to initiate a connection to the public
web server H2 and SMTP gateway H3; the internal firewall only allows public web server H2 to com-
municate with internal web server H9 and SMTP gateway H3 to communicate with internal DNS and
DHCP server H7.
User and Authentication Each host has two user groups: Administrator(Admin) and User. All
hosts use password authentication, and all users use the same passwords for multiple hosts. The user
and authentication information at each host is listed in Table 4.0.1.
Vulnerablitiy H2 and H3 contain a remote to admin vulnerability V1 and V2 respectively. H7
and H9 contain a remote to user vulnerability V4 and V3 respectively. H5 contains a local-to-admin
vulnerablitiy V5. These five atomic vulnerabilities are summarized in Table 4.0.2.
Host Username Group Password
H2 admin2 Admin {R, O }
H3 admin3 Admin {R, O }
H4 admin3 Admin {R, O}
userA User {R, O}
userB User {R, O}
H5 admin5 Admin {R, O}
userA User {R, O}
userC User {R, O}
H6 admin6 Admin {R, O}
userA User {R, O}
userD User {R, O}
H7 admin7 Admin {R, O}
userE User {R, O}
H8 userA Admin {R, O}
userB User {R, O}
userC User {R, O}
userD User {R, O}
H9 admin9 Admin {R, O}
userA User {R, O}
Table 4.0.1: User and Authentication
Host VulnID Effect
H2 V1 remotely gain Admin privileges
H3 V2 remotely gain Admin privileges
H5 V5 locally gain Admin privileges
H7 V4 remotely gain user privileges
H9 V3 remotely gain user privileges
Table 4.0.2: Vulnerabilities
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4.1 Attack Graphs
Based on network tologolgy, vulnerabilities and connectivity information, we obtain the attack
graph shown in Figure 4.1.1 as our initial. Starting with the initial attack graph, we iteratively ap-
ply the PE rules on the graph, one rule at a time, and terminates when no further successful expansion
are found. Figure 4.1.0 shows the corresponding attack graph at each step after applying PE Rule 1
→ 2→ 3→ 4→ 5→ 1→ 2→ 4→ 5.
Figure 4.1.1: Initial attack graph
4.1.1 Comparison of Attack Graph structure and Density
An attack graph is a directed graph where each vertex is a possible attack state and each edge
represents possible vulnerabilities which allow the attack to proceed from one state to another. Graph
density is a fraction of graphs edges to the maximum number of graph edges. The density reflects
how interconnected attack states are and how close the attack graph is to a complete graph. The graph
density is expected to increase as PE rules are applied. Table 4.1.1 summarizes the number of reachable
states, the number of edges and graph density at each step 1.
The result shows that the size of attack graph grows dramatically. The initial attack graph is very
sparsely connected with only 4 possible attack states and graph density of 0.023; While the closure
has 90 possible attack states, and the density is larger than 0.5, which is increase by 2239 percent.
The security threats in this example network are significantly more widespread than initially estimated
1From step 2 to step 4, and from step 7 to step 8, even the number of reachable states, edges and density is not changing,
the number of possible vulnerabilities on the edge increases, and the attackers could exploit anyone of them to proceed
14
(a) After apply PE1 (b) After apply PE2 (c) After apply PE3
(d) After apply PE4 (e) After apply PE5
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(f) After apply PE1 (g) After apply PE2
(h) After apply PE4 (i) After apply PE5
Figure 4.1.0: Iteratively apply PE rules on the attack graph
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Step 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
# ReachStates 4 10 15 15 15 19 19 19 19 19
# Edges 6 10 18 18 18 30 51 66 66 90
Density 0.023 0.047 0.094 0.094 0.094 0.164 0.287 0.374 0.374 0.515
Table 4.1.1: Graph structure and density
without taking into account the privilege expansion vulnerabilities.
4.1.2 Comparison of Attack Graph
After applying PE rules, the size and density of attack graph grows dramatically, and the complexity
of closure attack graph greatly exceeds human ability to understand and analyze. In [10], Mehta et al.
proposes to use Google PageRank algorithm to calculate the relative importance of each state in the
attack graph. The ranking indicates how likely the state is to be compromised by attackers.
Google PageRank PageRank is an algorithm used by Google search engine to determine the rel-
ative importance of webpages. Pagerank models the user web broswering behaviors as markov process
in which the states are pages, and the transitions, which are all equally probable, are the links between
pages. It also introduce damping factor d to capture the behavior that a random surfer get bored and
restart.
Similar to Google PageRank algorithm, we construct a Probabilistic Attack Model for our attack
graph, in which a transition from a state to another state represents an atomic attack. In [10], authors
prove Probabilistic Attack Model is ergodic Markov chain, and it will converges to a unique stationary
distribution after a long run. Damping factor models either the attacker will abort the current attack
and try a different way to attack the system or that the attacker could directly reach some states by
other means which is not modeled by attack path. For example, the attacker could trick the victim
to visit some malicious website, which serves browser zero-day vulnerabilities. After exploiting the
vulnerabilities, the victim’s computer got hacked.
Table 4.1.2 shows the pageRank scores for each attack state in the closure attack graph. Here, we
set damping factor d = 0.15
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State PageRank Score
userD,H8 0.09306474167676793
userB,H8 0.09306474167676793
userA,H6 0.08569358951092884
userA,H4 0.08569358951092884
userC,H8 0.08562096631409377
userA,H5 0.07945283649518894
userA,H9 0.06790948229877006
userA,H8 0.06747372595576011
userD,H6 0.05658952756385637
userB,H4 0.056589527563856365
userC,H5 0.05116836663549413
admin5,H5 0.0374298748387959
userE,H7 0.027517840456357336
admin2,H2 0.02148530547878595
admin3,H3 0.02148530547878595
admin7,H7 0.016395680296584843
admin9,H9 0.016395680296584843
admin6,H6 0.014149854768280156
admin4,H4 0.014149854768280156
Table 4.1.2: PageRank Score for each attack state
The results shows again that there are much more states reachable in the closure attack graph. The
most likely state (userA,H9) and (userE,H7) in the initial attack graph don’t score that high in the
closure attack graph, and these states become very transient after applying PE Rule.
4.2 Comparison of Exploitability
The paper [1] by Balzarotti et al. proposes a metric to quantitatively evaluate the risk of network
system based on the knowledge of the exploitability of vulnerabilities and interactions and dependency
among them. The exploitability of a vulnerability measures how complex the attack can be to exploit it
and the likelihood of successful exploits. In our example, we use this metric to compute the exploitabil-
ity for each attack state in the graph. We assign the exploitability values to each vulnerability ranging
from 0 to 10. Table 4.2.1 summarizes the values for each vulnerability. The exploitability of V1, V3,
PE1, PE3 and PE5 are high, because they are well-known widespread and very easy to be exploited with
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little effort; while V4, V5 and PE2 are hard to be exploited, and few have been successfully exploited
by previous attacks, therefore, the values are low; The exploitability of PE4 is on a medium scale.
The initial exploitability values for each attack state are all set to 0. Starting with the attacker state,
we iteratively update the values for each attack state by computing the easiest way (i.e., the maximum
value) of exploiting this state in the graph, until the system converges to stable. Table 4.2.2 shows the
exploitability values for each attack state in the initial and closure attack graph.
Vuln. Exploitability
V1 7
V2 4
V3 8
V4 3
V5 2
PE1 8
PE2 3
PE3 7
PE4 5
PE5 8
Table 4.2.1: Exploitability for each Vulnerability
State Exploitability
Initial AG Closure AG
admin2,H2 7 7
admin3,H3 4 7
admin4,H4 0 2
userA,H4 0 7
userB,H4 0 7
userA,H5 0 7
userC,H5 0 7
admin5,H5 0 7
admin6,H6 0 2
userA,H6 0 7
userD,H6 0 7
admin7,H7 0 7
userE,H7 3 7
userA,H8 0 7
userB,H8 0 7
userC,H8 0 7
userD,H8 0 7
admin9,H9 4 7
userA,H9 0 7
Table 4.2.2: Exploitability for each attack state
4.3 Comparison of METF
In [15], Ortalo et al. produces an early attack graph for quantitative evaluation for operational
security. Their techniques estimates mean effort to security failure(METF) using the Markov model
approach. Two metrics were proposed based on memoryless and total memory attack model. In their
METF work , they showed that as the number of paths increases in the graph, for realistic and knowl-
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edgeable attackers, the METF will decrease. In [8], Li et al. also points to give the intuition to treat the
same issue.
In our work, we have investigated METF as the metric, but have found several issues. First, it is
not trivial to compute the total memory metric. More importantly, many privilege expansion attack
edges are not independent of each other. This violates the assumptions of METF model. For instance,
a sniff password on the network will trigger many transitions in the Markov model. Considering ways
to represent these attack is in the area of future work.
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CHAPTER 5. PRIVILEGE EXPANSION TOOLKIT
5.1 The Architecture of Privilege Expansion Toolkit
We implemented a toolkit to facilitate integrating privilege expansion vulnerabilities into attack
graph for varied network environments. Figure 5.1.1 depicts the architecture of the toolkit. There
are five main components: network model, graph reader, PE rule processor, graph writer, and graph
analyzer. Network model collects all the necessary information about network topology and hosts,
users and authentication, connectivity, vulnerabilities and attacker profile from input configuration file,
which is written in XML format. Graph reader reads and parses the input attack graph written in dot
format [3] as the initial graph . The PE rule processor takes the network model and the initial graph to
produce an closure attack graph integrating with all the privilege expansion vulnerabilities. The graph
writer outputs the resulting attack graph in dot format and as adjacent matrix. The graph analyzer
generates the structure, density and exploitability data of the graph.
Network  Model
Network Topology & 
Hosts Information
User and Authentication
Connectivity
          Vulnerabilities
                   Attacker Profile
Graph Reader
PE Rule Processor
Graph Writer
- Graph in dot format  
- Graph adjacency matrix
Privilege Expansion Vulnerability Toolkit
Input Attack Graph
(In dot format)
Graph Analyzer
- Structure
- Density 
- Exploitability
Figure 5.1.1: The architecture of privilege expansion vulnerability toolkit
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5.2 A Medium-sized Network Example
We use the PE toolkit to produce an attack graph for a medium-sized network shown in Figure 5.2.1.
This network contains two local area networks: Office LAN and Lab LAN, and each LAN has 15 hosts.
User B, C and D have user privileges on every host in the Office LAN; and user E, F and G have user
privileges on every host in the Lab LAN. User A is a network administrator in charge of all the hosts in
the internal network. Two servers are deployed on the DMZ. The attacker is on the external network.
`
Attacker H0
DMZ 
Office LAN
H1
H2
…
H15
H16
H17
…
H30
Lab LAN
SRV2
SRV2
Internet
Figure 5.2.1: A medium-sized example network Figure 5.2.2: The closure attack graph for our
medium-sized example
Our initial attack graph contains 5 reachable attack states and 11 edges, and the density is 0.075%;
while the closure attack graph produced by the PE toolkit has 122 attack states, 3672 edges, and the
density is nearly one quarter(24.87%), which is 331.6 times denser than the initial. Some part of the
closure graph is too dense to be rendered appropriately in Dot, therefore, instead we use kamada-kawai
algorithm in R [16] to layout the graph shown in Figure 5.2.2. The attack graph can be partitioned
into six equivalence classes, and each class is a complete graph. Class A only has 1 node: node 122,
which represents the attacker on the external network; Class B have two nodes: node 49 and 3, which
represents the servers on DMZ; Class C and Class F are the similar in the structure, and each has 45
nodes respectively, which represents all the attack states in which users only have privileges on only
one LAN; Class E are class D are similar in the structure, and each has 15 nodes respectively, which
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represents all the attack states in which users have privileges on both LANs. From the graph, it is
easy to draw two conclusions. First, the protection boundary is between Class A and Class B, and it
is dangerous to let the attacker cross the boundary and enter into DMZ. Second, node 76, 39 and 95
are entry points to the internal network, Once any entry point gets to be compromised, the attacker can
jump to almost any attacker states in this attack graph.
Integrating the privilege expansion vulnerabilities and make attack graph more complete is one
purpose of the PE toolkit, and another is to allow security administrator to analyze and compare the
impact of different security solutions and policies on the whole network systems. Suppose the security
administrator proposes the following possible security solutions to mitigate the risk of systems:
• Solutions A: Change to encrypted network protocol in the internal networks
• Solutions B: Enforce a stronger user account management policy, which means any user can not
use the same password for multiple hosts.
• Solutions C: Harden the operating systems and make Trojan horse attack become much harder to
success
Scenario # of ReachState Density
Base 122 24.87%
Solution A 122 16.32%
Solution B 5 0.12%
Solution C 122 23.64%
Table 5.2.1: The impact of different security solutions
The Table 5.2.1 shows that in these three solutions, the solution B is the most effective one, since
without user access expansion, attacker can not jump to other hosts and then take the chances to expand
his privileges.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION
In this work, we define a set of privilege expansion vulnerabilities, and integrate them into attack
graphs by formalizing a set of rules used for adding or modifying existing attack graphs. Based on two
example attack graphs, we have shown how neglecting PEVs can lead to drastically optimistic attack
graphs. This can be seen in the dramatic increase in graph density as well as increase in the exploitation
metric of hosts in the network. This indicates that we can not neglect these vulnerabilities, otherwise
our attack graphs, and any analysis based on them will not be complete. In addition, we developed
a tool to integrate the privilege expansion vulnerability into existing attack graphs. The tool can also
can be used for simulating and evaluating the new security solutions by comparing countermeasures
that reduce the effect of PEVs. Our future work will evaluate the relative exploitability of privilege
expansion vulnerabilities in the real environment and study how to use and better represent these dense
attack graphs.
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